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I. INTRODUCTION
Let me begin by noting what a great program this is. Significantly, I
think it is good for judges to hear you, and to appreciate the real world in
which the factual settings that come before the courts have their genesis. It
is important for us to understand the transactional dynamics and the time
pressures within which business and legal strategic decisions are made.
Likewise, it may be relevant for you to hear us say that the factual setting and
procedural posture of each judicial decision are important, and may be
outcome-determinative.
There are very few bright line rules to govern the adjudication of
fiduciary duties. Post-1985, we know in general about the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care. For example, we know about the traditional business
judgment rule, the enhanced business judgment rule of Unocal/Unitrin,and
the duty to obtain the best value for stockholders in a sale of control.'
II. A THEMATIC FRAMEWORK
These general principles are just that - general. Most scholars would say
that Delaware should not move to a mandatory or codified system. A

Delaware Supreme Court.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen.
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
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rational corporation law/corporate governance regime depends on a rich body
of case law and the expertise, prompt service, independence, and trust in the
Delaware Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court.
The relationship between law and fact in ourjurisprudence is generally
determined by the form of the law to be applied. For example, the law may
be a broad, fact-intensive standard, or a bright-line rule that focuses on a few
key facts. The choice between a broad standard and a bright-line rule is not or at least should not be - an arbitrary choice. Each form of law carries with
it various costs and benefits that make it more or less attractive in a given
context.
Standards are extremely flexible in the face of unusual facts or a rapidly
changing environment because standards do not limit the range of factors
that a court may consider in reaching its judgment. This flexibility also
reduces the risk of legal error because the court is not required to apply a
standardized solution to a unique factual problem. But flexibility comes at
a cost; it is sometimes difficult to predict how the standard will apply to a
given case, and parties may be exposed to some legal uncertainty.
In contrast, bright-line rules provide greater certainty, and are well suited
to regulate repeated and relatively homogeneous activities. Rules enhance
certainty by focusing attention on a set of key factors, but they are necessarily
inflexible, and may effectively ignore other important factors. Choosing a
law's optimal form depends on careful consideration of these costs and
benefits in a given context.
It is my thesis that this cost-benefit analysis explains the structure of the
Delaware law applied to corporate transactions - that is, the manner in which
the courts have defined the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Law in this
context often takes the form of coherent and stable principles driving factintensive decisions because the law must handle a wide variety of conduct.
As a result, it is impracticable to devise a bright-line regulatory scheme that
could: 1) adequately cover the vast corporate landscape, 2) prevent
circumvention by unscrupulous actors, and 3) keep pace with changes in
corporate governance, takeover strategies and defenses, and financial devices.
Last December 7th (Delaware Day), I had the honor of giving the
keynote address in Stockholm to the Conference on Company Law Reform
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Some of what was discussed there is relevant here.
At this conference, all European countries, and many other countries
around the world, were represented in a kind of United Nations setting.
The conferees were exchanging ideas on issues of company law reform. One
theme emerged as dominant; many conferees were yearning for a judicial
system like the well-developed system ofjudge-made fiduciary duty law we
have in Delaware. They all seemed to believe our system works well, even
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with all its warts. They were amazed by, and envious of,our expertise, factspecificity, and the speed of our decisions. Nevertheless, they seemed to be
resigned to the reality that their judicial systems were not set up to replicate
Delaware's.
A. The EnablingModel
An overarching global debate is whether corporate law rules should be
mandatory or enabling. I agree with those scholars whose thesis is that the
enabling model is the better economic model for the stockholders. The
enabling model, patterned after the Delaware approach, is based on a few
fundamental statutory guideposts and latitude for private ordering, with
primary reliance on self-governance centered on judicial decisionmaking in
applying fiduciary duties to fact-intensive settings.
A word of caution is that the judge-made law must not be of a
freewheeling or ad hoc quality. It must involve a disciplined and stable stare
decisis analysis based on precedent and a coherent economic rationale. The
private ordering aspect of it must provide, ex ante, the contractual stockholder
protections deemed important, as distinct from ex post judicial rewriting of
the contractual framework.
At the end of the day the enabling model - at least in Delaware - rests on
a two-fold trust in the judiciary, and in the board of directors. That trust, in
turn, is predicated on two fundamental principles. The first is character - by
that I mean expertise, diligence, good faith, independence, and
professionalism. The second is a sound economic rationale dedicated to the
best interests of stockholders.
First the courts. Investors, as the owners of corporations, have certain
expectations of the role of courts in the enforcement of fiduciary duties. The
judicial process is a key ingredient in the overall corporate construct among
the four parties involved - the stockholders, directors, management, and state
government (legislative, executive, and judicial). Courts should be prompt,
clear, predictable, stable, and economically coherent.
Second the directors. All the attributes of character are important, but
perhaps the most effective stockholder protection device is the independence
of directors. Stockholders vote for directors and expect proper governance
from them. The expectation is a strong bond of trust vested in the directors.
Courts enforce that trust. At the same time, courts should be reluctant to
interfere with business decisions and should not create surprises or wild
doctrinal swings in their expectations of directorial behavior.
The duties of directors are defined in broad outline by the enabling act.
The fiduciary aspects of the directors' duties are fleshed out by the caselaw.
That is the corporate law dimension. The remainder of the corporate
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governance regime consists of private ordering, norms, and aspirations of
well-motivated directors to achieve best practices with the precatory
encouragement of courts.
Modern and enlightened corporation law, driven primarily by judicial
decisions, is a remarkable vehicle in ourjurisprudence. There is a significant
self-governing aspect to the corporation law, in that daily functions of the
enterprise are based largely on norms - i.e.. non-legally enforceable
governance mechanisms. Self-governance works for the most part because
of the sensitivity of directors to do what is right, what is professional, what
is honorable, and what is profitable. There are also negative motivators such
as peer pressure, shaming, and fear of lawsuits.
B. Recent Data on Business Cases
Over the past several years, the Court of Chancery has had a docket of
over 500 active cases per year, on average. Seventy-five percent of them are
business cases. I use the term business cases to include typical corporate
cases - those involving the internal affairs of Delaware corporations. These
may arise as injunctive, derivative, individual, or class actions. Business cases
also include cases relating to limited liability companies, limited partnerships,
joint ventures, and other types of contract disputes.
That is a staggering caseload, considering the complexity and importance
of the cases. Moreover, it should be understood that the remaining 25% of
the Chancery docket consists ofother important and urgent equity cases (e.g.
wills, trusts, injunctions, contract interpretation, right-to-die cases,
government affairs issues, and many others).
The Supreme Court is one of general jurisdiction, with a docket of
nearly 600 cases per year. We have an all-inclusive jurisdiction (criminal,
constitutional, business, tort, contract, family, first amendment, prisoner
cases, etc.), as Delaware is a microcosm of America. Less than 10% of the
Delaware Supreme Court's docket consists of business cases on appeal from
the Court of Chancery. Probably about 5% are purely corporate cases.
(There are additional business cases that come up on appeal from Superior
Court, and the important role of that Court is another topic for another day.)
However, as you may expect, many of the business cases adjudicated by the
Supreme Court are of such precedential importance that they probably take
more than 20% of our time.
The disposition rate of the Delaware Courts is rather prompt. The
Supreme Court moves about ten cases per week. Since the Supreme Court
usually sits in panels of three, this means that each of the five justices must
function on the disposition of one case per day, every day of the year on
average. We are able to average about 30 days from submission to
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disposition, though some cases may take 60-90 days, and a few take longer.
As you all know, the Court of Chancery is famous for prompt dispositions
and expedited cases. The foregoing is a glimpse at the quantitative
dimension. Now for the qualitative analysis.
In recent years, over 90% of the business cases disposed of by the Court
of Chancery were not appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. There are
various reasons for that phenomenon (the changing dynamics of individual
corporate transactions, satisfaction with the Chancery decision, delay, costs,
settlement, etc.). Nevertheless, I see it as a tribute to the expertise and
prompt work of this very special trial court that has had a consistently
distinguished record over its 209-year existence.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirms about 75% of the Chancery
business cases that are appealed. In nearly half of the 75% that are affirmed,
the affirmance is substantially on the basis or rationale of the Chancery
decisions. Only about 15% are reversed outright and about 10% are affirmed
in part and reversed in part. When a Chancery decision is reversed, it is often
a case of first impression, or a new approach to the law by the Delaware
Supreme Court.
C. A Slice of History
The reason for Delaware's preeminence in the corporate area began with
the 1897 Delaware Constitution. That document depoliticized the Delaware
Judiciary, creating a gubernatorial-appointed, Senate-confirmed, and
bipartisan Judicial Branch. From a time early in the 20th Century to the
present, the Court of Chancery has distinguished itself as the premier trial
court in the nation for corporate cases.
The adjudication of corporate cases was primarily in the context of
stockholder derivative and class actions from the early20th Century until the
hostile takeover days beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Deciding
those cases in the context of the high stakes and high velocity of the takeover
era put a great strain on the Delaware Judiciary and its stable body of
jurisprudence.
D. The 1985 Watershed
The year 1985 was a watershed year in Delaware corporatejurisprudence.
Also, it was a particularly interestingyear to examine the interaction between
the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court. The first two of
the landmark cases that year involved reversals of the Court of Chancery by
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the Supreme Court: Smith v. Van Gorkom2 and Unocal.3 In the next two cases,
Moran v. Household4 and Revlon v. MacAndrews,s it was the Court of Chancery
that presaged the landmark pronouncements of the Supreme Court in
affirming the Chancery decisions.
Smith, of course, is famous for the proposition that directors may be
personally liable if they fail to use due care in decision making.6 That case
led to a new dimension in legal analysis of process due care, and a new
statutory regime designed to protect directors.
Unocal, however, represented a sea change in the judicial review of the
conduct of directors of a target corporation.7 The Court of Chancery had
enjoined a selective self-tender primarily because of its exclusivity (i.e.,
excluding the bidder). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was
no clear-cut Delaware law that precluded such director action. Instead, the
Supreme Court established the landmark enhanced businessjudgment rule with
its intermediate burden on the directors to show that they reasonably
perceived a threat, and that the defensive measures they had taken in
response were reasonable in relation to the threat. This rubric has now
become commonplace in Chancery analysis, but it was an innovative
doctrine at that time.
The Court of Chancery got it right in the other two landmark cases that
year. In Household,Vice Chancellor (nowJustice) Walsh conducted a trial to
examine the workings of the poison pill, holding that the directors had the
power to install the pill, but future boards of directors had to be mindful of
their fiduciary duties in considering the obligation to redeem the pill in the
face of certain threatened takeovers.' The Chancery decision was essentially
ratified, though explicated authoritatively, by the Supreme Court.9
The final shoe to fall in 1985 was the decision in Revlon enjoining a lockup in a sale of control.t0 The teaching of Revlon is that as directors move
from the mode of defending the firm's independence, to the mode of selling
control, they must obtain the best value reasonably available for stockholders.
Again, the Supreme Court explicated the precedent authoritatively. But in

2

3

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).

Unocal, 493 A.2d 946.
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
s
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch. 1985).
Smith, 488 A.2d 858.
Unocal, 493 A.2d 946.
Moran, 490 A.2d 1059.
9
Moran, 500 A.2d 1346.
to
Revlon, 501 A.2d 1239.
4
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its essential holding, the Supreme Court ratified the decision of then Vice
Chancellor Walsh. 1
E. Time Warner and QVC
Sometimes the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately comes to realize the
articulation of the Court of Chancery was right after all. In the Time Warner
case in the late 1980s, the Court of Chancery found the directors of the target
had acted properly under the Unocal standard because the board had broad
discretion to determine the strategy and destiny of the firm, as long as the
sale of control was not implicated. 12 The Supreme Court affirmed, but
reformulated the test. 3 That reformulation was seen by some as providing
an argument for a target that Revlon applied only when there was a change of
control and a break up.
In Paramount v. QVC, just four years later, the directors of the target
company selling control did argue that the Supreme Court's Time Warner
decision required both a sale of control and an inevitable break up. 4 In
affirming Vice Chancellor Jacobs' decision, we held in QVC that no such
double requirement was intended in Time Warner, and we effectively
reinstated the notion articulated by the Chancellor in Time Warner that the
appropriate inquiry implicating Revlon "is whether a change of control is
contemplated.""5

II. FACTUAL SETTING AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OFTEN
DETERMINATIVE

The fact-intensive aspect of Delaware corporate jurisprudence is well
illustrated by cases involving the spectrum of modern mergers and
acquisition cases. The Court of Chancery, on a regular and urgent basis,
undertakes to apply the sometimes incompletely developed legal principles
articulated in the occasional Delaware Supreme Court decisions in the area.
Why are these principles incompletely developed? The main reason not
all jurisprudential principles are fully developed by the Supreme Court is
because most cases stop in the Court of Chancery, so the Supreme Court
doesn't regularly get a chance to pronounce new principles. Given the small

"
12

Revlon, 506 A.2d 173.
In re Time, Inc., S'holder Litig., Del. Ch., CA No. 10670,1989 WL 79880, Allen, C. (July14,

1989).
13
14

Is

Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990) ("Time Warner").
QVC Network Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993).
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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percentage of Chancery's busy docket that is appealed to the Supreme Court,
it naturally falls to the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors to make most of the
law in the corporate area. And they do a superb job.
Take, for example, several recent Court of Chancery cases that have dealt
in detail with deal protection measures. A number of these cases in the past
two years have analyzed various everyday transactional issues such as
standstill agreements, material adverse change, breakup fees, no-shop,
window-shop, and no-talk provisions in the context of fiduciary duties. The
results in these cases differ, but they may differ largely because of the varying
factual circumstances.
Three of these cases dealingwith the fiduciary out issue in varying forms
are: Phelps Dodge v. Cyprus;'6 Ace v. CapitalRe;17 and IXC v. CincinnatiBell.'
None of these cases was appealed, so the Court of Chancery has made the
law in this area, at least until some case raising these issues makes its way to
the Supreme Court in the future.
I would like to focus on only one of these cases - Vice Chancellor
Strine's decision in Ace v. CapitalRe.' 9 This was an emergency case if there
ever was one! It was decided in one day with a very analytical, well-crafted
sixteen page opinion. I say very analytical and well-crafted, but I am not
saying it was necessarily correct or incorrect.
In this case, the merger partner (Ace) of the target (Capital Re) went to
court for injunctive relief to enforce its interpretation of a no-talk/fiduciaryout deal-protection provision in the face of the target board's desire to move
toward the higher bidder. Ace did not succeed. The Vice Chancellor refused
to enjoin the target board from spurning the merger with Ace in favor of a
higher proposed deal with a third party (XL Capital). This case illustrates the
tension between:
" The economic desirability of protecting a deal with a notalk/limited fiduciary out and the target board's fiduciary duty.
" The principles applicable to stock-for-stock mergers (which this
was) and sale of control transactions like Paramount ° (which this
case was not).

16

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Del. Ch., CA. Nos. 17398, 17383, 17427,

1999 WIL 1054255, Chandler, C. (Sept. 27, 1999) (bench ruling, decided in a one-month period).
17
Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
19
In re IXC Communications, Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc., CA Nos. 17324, 17334, 1999 WL
1009174, Steele, V.C. (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (Mem. Op.).
19
Ace Ltd., 747 A.2d 95.
20
Paramount,637 A.2d 34.
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The scope of judicial review: whether to apply a substantive
reasonableness standard of scrutiny or a lesser standard in
evaluating director conduct in deal protection decisions.

In Ace, a no-talk provision in the merger agreement would have prohibited
the target - Capital Re - from soliciting, initiating, encouraging, or taking any
action to knowingly facilitate the submission of any inquiries, proposals, or
offers from any person. That provision also would have prohibited the target
from even providing information to a third party bidder unless the Capital
Re board decided "in good faith ...
based on the written advice of its outside
counsel" that negotiations, or giving information to a third party bidder was
required to prevent a breach of fiduciary duty.2 The facts in detail are very
important. One key fact was that the stockholder vote was virtually assured
for the Ace merger as Ace controlled 46% of the votes.
In short, the Court construed the fiduciary out provision to leave the
decision to the board's - not counsel's -judgment. That would make it valid,
and would justify the board's action in opting for the third party bid.
Alternatively, the court held that if the contract were construed as Ace
wanted (that counsel's advice was determinative), then the provision would
be against public policy. Apparently, either way Ace would lose.
The facts and procedural posture of Capital Re thus differed from
CincinattiBell (where the board had already conducted a market canvass),'
and Phelps Dodge (where the Chancellor's decision seemed to turn on the
board's willful blindness in the context of the duty of care). 23 In the context
of its facts and procedural posture, Capital Re seems to stand for the
proposition that a no-talk provision without a fiduciary-out, or a fiduciaryout that requires a lawyer to sign an opinion that the board is required to
consider other options, is unenforceable when the board seeks to consider
other and potentially better options.24
All three cases (Capital Re, Phelps Dodge and Cincinnati Bell) seem
consistent with the proposition that no-talk provisions are not invalid per se
ifaccompanied by a meaningful fiduciary-out that would allow the board to
do what it believes appropriate in the face of a superior deal, although the
original partner may insist on notice and an opportunity to top. At the heart
of any jurisprudence in this area should be a concern for the best interests of
stockholders.

21
2

23
24

Ace Ltd., 747 A.2d 95, at 98-99.
CincinattiBell, 1999 WIL 1009174.
PhelpsDodge, 1999 WL 1054255.
Ace Ltd., 747 A.2d 95.
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The factual texture and procedural posture of each case is determinative.
For example, what would have been the analysis in CapitalRe if the board
had wanted to stay with Ace rather than wanting to consider other
alternatives? That would be an interesting scenario, but it would not be
appropriate for me to express any views on these cases, or any of these
hypotheses.
Another example of the need to look carefully at the facts and procedural
posture is demonstrated by the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision in
McMullin v. Beran (ARCO).2s For example, there was some discussion today
that our decision in the ARCO case was questionable. But I think those
questioning the decision need to understand that the case arose on the
pleadings only, in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In that
context, we must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.
Those allegations included sharp criticism of the processes of the board and
the claim that the transaction was driven in part by the parent company's
appetite for cash.
IV. WHAT ADVICE IS APPROPRIATE?

Before turning to advice, it is important to reach the following general
conclusions and observations about the state of Delaware's jurisprudence in
this area:
*
*
*
*

The cases are fact intensive.
The Court of Chancery is doing a great job of analysis and service
to the bar and the business community.
The Court is defining and applying the law on a daily basis by filling
in the gaps left by pending further Supreme Court development.
If any case is appealed, the Supreme Court may clarify these legal
principles (or perhaps not if the case before us is shown to be purely
factual).

I would always advise counsel for the parties to identify the safe harbors, and
then let the clients make the risk assessment. Usually if the clients stay
within a safe harbor they need not worry, but the economics or exigencies of
a given transaction may require one to consider pushing the envelope beyond
the safe harbors. One easy example is that in many contexts a break-up fee
26
of about 2.5% may be in the safe harbor range. But what about 6%?27
2
2
27

McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000) ("ARCO").
See Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 695 A.2d 43 (Del. Supes. 1997).
See Phelps Dodge, 1999 WL 1054255.
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For example, assume, only as a working hypothesis, that the court may not
apply the deferential business judgment rule to your transaction, but might
apply a more searching reasonableness scrutiny. Will your client's business
decisions pass that test? If that is problematic, you simply lay out the risks
and the client decides.
Just looking at some of the materials for this conference, one can find
sound advice. For example, Frank Balotti's paper points out that good faith
reliance by directors on officers, committees, and experts may be a safe
harbor under Section 141(e). But he points to the Macmillan21 case, and
warns that directors may not avoid their duty of oversight by such reliance
in a sale of control where the insiders are among the bidders.
Other examples of advice in the materials at this conference include the
Wachtel Lipton general advice letters. I suggest you simply look at some of
the concluding excerpts in their memos:
The decision in Ash v. McCall2 9 thus reinforces many of the
traditional themes of Delaware law - deference to the business
judgment of directors, protection for directors who properly rely on
independent experts, avoidance of crude hindsight judgments,
careful scrutiny of a board's response once clear red flags arise, and
apparent problems need to be addressed at the board level. The
ruling signals that, while Delaware will continue to allow
shareholders to pursue genuine claims arising out of directors' actual
knowledge ofwrongdoing (or gross negligence in failing to oversee),
Delaware will not second-guess the good faith decisions of directors
who approve an acquisition based on expert advice and appropriate
board process. McKesson/HBOC is a timely reminder that
thoughtfulness and good process are as important from an acquiring
board's perspective as from a seller's.
ARCO represents a further example ofthe Delaware courts' concern
that the rights of public minority shareholders be somehow
protected when a control shareholder causes a cash-out transaction
to occur, even when the control person is not affiliated with the
buyer and there has been arms-length negotiation.30 In such
situations, if, as in ARCO, no special committee is appointed to

28
29

Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
Ash v. McCall, Del. Ch., CA No. 17132, Chandler, W. (Sept. 15, 2000) ("McKessorn/

HBOC).
30

See McMuUin, 765 A.2d 910.
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represent the interests of the public, it will apparently be relatively
easy for a shareholder complaint to survive a motion to dismiss in
Delaware, if the plaintiffs can plausibly allege that the interests of the
parent diverge from those of the public. Corporations involved in
such potential transactions can reduce the risks of litigation,
however, by thoughtful structuring of the process to protect public
minorities while recognizing (as the ARCO opinion does itself) the
business realities that are present when a majority shareholder is
determined to exist.
The Digex decision, like the ARCO Chemical case, shows the
continuing zeal of the Delaware courts in strictly scrutinizing the
process by which transactions involving a majority shareholder
occur.31 Where the evidence appears to show that negotiating

leverage for the public minority exists but has not been tested in
discussions with the buyer, the courts will be skeptical that the result
is fair. Parties contemplating transactions involving a controlled
company should accordingly engage in thoughtful planning of an
appropriate process, and consider how representatives of a public
minority can play a constructive role in the evolution of a deal that
recognizes the legitimate interests of both majority and minority
shareholders.

V. CONCLUSION

Stay tuned for further developments. Some of the recent Chancery cases
have decided some fundamental questions that someday might come to the
Supreme Court for a decision on a jurisprudential fork in the road. For
example:
*

"

31

Should the judicial review of deal protection mechanisms be based
on the business judgment rule analysis, or should courts review
these provisions for substantive reasonableness?
Should the rules for change of control cases be applied to stock-forstock deals to the extent of judicial scrutiny of deal protection
mechanisms?

In re Digex, Inc. S'holder Litig., Del. Ch., Consol. CA 18336, Chandler, C. (Dec. 13,2000).
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What are the contract rights of one merger partner if the other feels
it wants to, or should, go with a sweeter bid? Does the QVC
holding need further gloss?
Without commenting on the merits of any of the cases, I can say that the
Court of Chancery is carrying out in excellent fashion the goals of courts that
I mentioned earlier (promptness, clarity, predictability, stability, and a
coherent economic rationale). The bar and the business community are in
good hands, as the Court of Chancery is doing an internationally respected
and superb job of managing these exigent cases with complex facts.

